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Taking to the Sea: The Modern Seasteading
Movement in the Context of Other Historical
Intentional Communities
MEGAN BINDER*
ABSTRACT
Though its mission may seem to belong to the realm of science
fiction-establishing self-sufficient, floating cities on the high seas-the
modern seasteading movement is simply the next iteration of mankind's
long quest to establish more perfect societies. If they wish to accomplish
their goals, seasteaders must be prepared to confront and overcome
serious obstacles on technological, social, and legal fronts. Reviewing
other historical examples of intentional communities offers a glimpse of
the potential challenges that are common across all such movements and
suggests that, to ensure long-term success, seasteaders may benefit long-
term from pursuing international recognition of sovereignty for their
eventual communities.
INTRODUCTION
In Plato's telling of the myth of Atlantis, the fantastic island empire
exists as a model of Plato's idealized notion of the perfect city-state, a
vivid extension of his philosophical musings in the Republic.1 When the
city is swallowed by floods and earthquakes, lost with it is Plato's ideal
vision of the perfect republic, the classical utopia that he envisioned as
* Executive Editor, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Volume 23; J.D. Candidate
2016, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. I would like to thank Professor
Christiana Ochoa for her guidance and wisdom, which were particularly essential in the
early drafting of this Note. I would also like to thank Nick Parker for his unwavering
support, without whom this Note would not have been possible and life would be much
less pleasant.
1. See Kathryn A. Morgan, Designer History: Plato's Atlantis Story and Fourth-
Century Ideology, 118 J. HELLENIC STUD. 101, 101 (1998) ("[T]he Atlantis myth
corresponds to the conditions specified in the Republic for the successful creation of a
charter myth (the 'Noble Lie') for the ideal city .... ").
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the ideal residence for the best parts of mankind.2 But though Atlantis
was lost, even now, more than two millennia later, the pursuit and
vision of an ideal state has endured.
The popular conception of what, precisely, defines an ideal
community has certainly changed significantly throughout the ages.3 It
has taken diverse forms for diverse communities, 4 but throughout
human history, individuals have come together and pursued the
development of what may be termed "intentional communities" as
realizations of ideals. The pursuit of the ideal makes some sense to us;
humans are naturally curious creatures who trend towards a conception
of a better world-somewhere out there-a better world that we might
be able to realize if we only try.5 In creating an intentional community
(that is, a community built explicitly around a central ideology or aim),
the community-builders believe that their individual lives are bettered
by being with other like-minded individuals in a place where their
ideals can be freely explored.
The history of intentional communities suggests that they may
develop in one of two ways: by self-imposed cultural and ideological
isolation from the broader society (e.g., the development of
fundamentalist Christian communities in the United States);6 or by
total political separation, state-building, and claiming membership in
the international community as a sovereign (e.g., the establishment of
Liberia as a home for freed slaves).7
From the perspective of some prospective world-builders, only
through geographic isolation can a truly successful, independent
intentional community succeed, untainted by the majority society.8 But
in the modern world, as frontiers recede and an increasingly globalized
world means there are fewer and fewer places where ideological
entrepreneurs can stake their claims, some argue that the only place
where a successful intentional community can exist is where Plato's
Atlantis did: at sea. The so-called "seasteading" movement envisions
manmade structures on the sea that are wholly or largely independent
2. See Gerard Naddaf, The Atlantis Myth: An Introduction to Plato's Later Philosophy
of History, 48 PHOENIX 189, 191 (1994).
3. See, e.g., ISAIAH BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY: CHAPTERS IN THE
HISTORY OF IDEAS 1 (Henry Hardy ed., 2d ed. 2013).
4. See, e.g., FRANCES FITZGERALD, CITIES ON A HILL (1986) (chronicling four diverse
examples of intentional communities throughout the United States in the middle of the
twentieth century).
5. See BERLIN, supra note 3, at 3.
6. See FITZGERALD, supra note 4, at 121-201.
7. Editorial Comment, Liberia, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 958, 959-60 (1909).
8. See FITZGERALD, supra note 4, at 9.
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of established, continental nation-states. 9 These seasteaders see in the
open ocean an opportunity to create their own space to experiment with
economic and political philosophies in ways that are difficult or
impossible to carry out in existing societies. The contemporary
seasteading movement comprises tech-focused dreamers of the new
millennium who follow a tradition established by sea-based idealists
who are convinced that the open ocean---or the less closed parts and
underutilized islands of it-promise a new and better societal option for
those brave enough to take advantage of it.1°
These modern seasteaders are led by the well-funded Seasteading
Institute (TSI) (cofounded by its financial backer, PayPal creator Peter
Thiel, and Patri Friedman, ideological heir and biological grandson of
free-market champion Milton Friedman)" and followed by other lower-
profile but equally passionate supporters of the proliferation of
manmade structures at sea. 12 These most vocal activists generally argue
that the creation of permanent, manmade, largely self-sufficient floating
cities on the ocean ("seasteads") would allow greater individual freedom
for its citizens, encourage experimentation in governments, and create
better economic opportunities for businesses.13 The appeal of the open
ocean is its apparent "lawlessness"; international law has far fewer
rules and far less reach on the high seas, and for seasteaders who dream
of limited or experimental governments, the promise of a tabula rasa is
enough to want to brave the stormiest of seas.
Indeed, the considerable technological challenges of the seasteader
dream are many, and the movement itself has been criticized as
9. See generally SEASTEADING INST., http://www.seasteading.org (last visited Feb. 15,
2016) (providing descriptive videos of floating cities and exploring the technology required
to foster them).
10. See Philip Hayward, Islands and Micronationality: An Introduction, 8 SHiMA: INT'L
J. RES. ISLAND CULTURES 1, 5 (2014) ("While much of the rhetoric of seasteading is
entwined with technological futurism, at its core is a similar vision of anarcho-syndicalism
to that attributed to maritime pirate societies in the 18th Century by Hakim Bey in his
influential essay 'The Temporary Autonomous Zone'; that of island-based 'intentional
communities'").
11. See Josh Harkinson, My Sunset Cruise with the Clever, Nutty, Techno-Libertarian
Seasteading Gurus, MOTHER JONES (Jun. 7, 2012, 5:10 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2012/06/seasteading-institute-conference-libertarian-utopia.
12. See, e.g., Doug Bandow, Getting Around Big Government: The Seastead Revolution
Begins to Take Shape, FORBES (July 30, 2012, 9:45 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sitesl
dougbandow/2012/07/30/getting-around-big-government-the-seastead-revolution-begins-
to-take-shape#3f08779879ed ("Seasteading would allow residents to avoid supporting the
usual tangle of public bureaucracies and accompanying gaggle of private parasites-
lobbyists, journalists, even think tank analysts-that dominate Washington."). It is
perhaps unsurprising that Bandow, a regular Forbes columnist, is a Cato Institute Fellow.
13. See SEASTEADING INST., THE FLOATING CITY PROJECT 8 (2014).
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fledgling. 14 Yet their case is provocative: to seasteaders, developing a
good or perfect government may be possible, but it requires the kind of
experimentation that can only take place in a vacuum, as afforded by a
wholly new community at sea. 15 In their own way, seasteaders are
attempting to revive a .vision of Plato's Atlantis: a community that
expressly tries to avoid the pitfalls of existing governments and
attempts to achieve an ideal community of choice for its members.
Today, the most vocal prospective seasteaders are generally
dismissed by the majority of the steadfastly mainlander human
population as not "completely crazy" 16 at best, but more often simply as
"nutty."17 The radical ideology of abandoning the land altogether in
favor of an experimental project in the middle of the sea may be
somewhat surprising, and it may prompt more questions and critiques
than the movement is ready to answer. Yet the idea of a new frontier
has always excited mankind, and the idea of conquering the sea is worth
contemplating.
Thus, this Note aims to address and predict the unique social and
legal challenges that would confront the seasteading movement should
it ever overcome the technological challenges and take sail. In doing so,
this Note looks to the long history of intentional communities in an
attempt to contextualize the seasteader ideology, while also using those
examples as parables to examine the unique challenges (and possible
solutions to those challenges) faced by the seasteading movement.
Part I serves as an introduction to intentional communities,
observing their commonalities, prevalence, and the distinct challenges
confronted in their development and ongoing existence. In Part I, four
distinct examples of intentional communities are examined. Two of
these examples (Liberia and Israel) represent intentional communities
that "broke free" of their majority societies and developed into distinct,
sovereign states; two other examples (the Castro neighborhood in San
Francisco and the evangelical Christian community headed by Jerry
Falwell) represent communities that existed within a majority society as
nonindependent subcultures of it. Part II turns to the seasteading
movement itself, distinguishing the modern movement and its ideology
from isolated attempts at individual sea-based settlements and finding
useful parallels between the modern seasteaders and other intentional
communities. This section explores the core ideology of the most vocal
14. See Cities on the Ocean, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 3, 2011, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/21540395.
15. See Patri Friedman, Beyond Folk Activism, CATO UNBOUND (Apr. 6, 2009),
http://www.cato-unbound.org/2009/04/06/patri-friedmantbeyond-folk-activism.
16. See Cities on the Ocean, supra note 14.
17. See Harkinson, supra note 11.
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seasteaders, parsing the public speeches and writings made by
Friedman himself and looking to polls conducted by the Seasteading
Institute of its own members. Part III outlines the legal realities and
challenges for the seasteading movement in particular, noting the
unique international scheme that sparsely regulates the seas and
acknowledging that it is precisely this challenge that appeals greatly to
the movement and seems the answer to their core dream. Finally, Part
IV considers the history of other intentional community movements in
tandem with the ideology and realities of the seasteading movement,
and draws conclusions about what challenges seasteaders may
encounter and how they can use the lessons of other communities before
them to anticipate and overcome those challenges.
1. DEFINING AND EXAMINING HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF INTENTIONAL
COMMUNITIES
Though the professed goal of seasteaders may seem incredibly
modern or even futuristic (the images of a floating city on the high seas
feel as though they ought to belong firmly to the realms of science fiction
authors), the concept of ideological individuals uniting behind a common
cause which demands relocation and community-building is quite
ancient. For religious, ethnic, ideological, or even cultural reasons,
humans have long built communities with the express intent of not just
subsistence living, but rather a realization of specific ideals. Section A
explores commonalities found across these communities in an attempt
to understand the needs of modern-day seasteaders better, as well as
conducts in-depth consideration of multiple individual examples.
Because of the unique nature of seasteads, Section B discusses and
surveys the examples of both sovereign intentional communities and
subcommunities within existing majority societies.
A. Defining and Understanding Intentional Communities
Intentional communities are discrete groups consciously formed for
a specific purpose or aim.18 In most cases, these communities exist as
discrete subcommunities within an existing society; however, in rare
cases, intentional communities result in the establishment of their own
sovereign territories (e.g., the nineteenth century founding of Liberia
and the twentieth century founding of Israel, discussed below).
18. See Susan Love Brown, Introduction, in INTENTIONAL COMMUNITY: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE 1, 3 (Susan Love Brown ed., 2002).
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The reasons such communities are founded are disparate (religious,
spiritual, ideological, etc.), yet anthropologists see among these diverse
communities commonalities in their founding reasons. First, its
prospective members feel at odds with, or a need to withdraw from,
their native society; 19 second, the intentional-community ideal allows
these self-identified outsiders an opportunity to "vot[e] with the feet."20
Brown writes that intentional communities represent a "call to action
that is personal and communal, bringing together the needs of the
individual with those of other individuals."21 These communities are
indeed often seen (at least by their members) 22 as trending to utopian
ideals, and the rhetoric and emotional involvement of prospective
members is nothing less than that of utopian pioneers.
Rosabeth Moss Kanter writes that the pursuit of the utopian ideal is
a recurring theme in human history.23 Throughout disparate cultures
and civilizations, the idea that a "better" world and society is possible
has been a powerful force driving both mainstream social movements
and smaller intentional community movements that see breaking away
and developing their own idealized communities as the best way to
achieve utopia. As Kanter writes,
Underlying the vision of utopia is the assumption that
harmony, cooperation, and mutuality of interests are
natural to human existence, rather than conflict,
competition, and exploitation, which arise only in
imperfect societies . . . . Utopian plans are partly an
escape, as critics maintain, and partly a new creation,
partly a flight from and partly a seeking for; they
criticize, challenge, and reject the established order,
then depart from it to seek the perfect human
existence. 24
To achieve their utopian ideals, Kanter notes that intentional
communities seek self-determination in one or more forms. 25 Intentional
communities may make their own laws, ignore or abrogate the laws or
19. Id. at 5-6.
20. Id. at 5.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 8 (arguing that an objective examination of such communities shows
"unequivocally" that they are "anything but" idealized utopias).
23. See ROSABETH Moss KANTER, COMMITMENT AND COMMUNITY: COMMUNES AND
UTOPIAS IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (1972) (describing the origin and history of
possibly thousands of Utopias in the United States in particular).
24. Id. at 1-2.
25. See id. at 2.
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norms of the larger society, establish geographical boundaries, have a
way of distinguishing between members and nonmembers, and, above
all, implement the guiding set of values that first initiated the founding
of the community. 26 Any operating decisions are made in terms of those
foundational values; as Kanter notes of any intentional community,
"[i]ts primary end is an existence that matches the ideals."27
These commonalities of purpose and generalized utopian ideology
have manifested diversely in real-world examples of these intentional
communities. Reviewing specific examples in Section B offers greater
insight into how these communities manifest, and the challenges that
have confronted them.
B. Surveying Intentional Communities: Examples and Challenges
It is worth looking closely at individual examples in the history of
intentional communities to understand the patchwork of communities
that modern seasteaders would find themselves a part of. Though
Brown and Kanter's characterizations of individual intentional
community-makers trend true across many of the intentional
communities studied, there are key differences in how these intentional
communities are perceived in mainstream society. The most crucial
factor determining how mainstream societies perceive intentional
community movements is whether an intentional community seeks and
is able to establish itself as a sovereign entity, one on equal footing with
other nation-states and widely accepted communities. Sovereign
intentional communities are rare, but not impossible. Two of the most
prominent examples modern history are the nineteenth century
founding of the West African nation of Liberia and the twentieth
century founding of the Jewish state of Israel in Mandatory Palestine.
1. Sovereign Intentional Communities
a. Liberia
The modern nation of Liberia, situated on the west coast of Africa,
had its roots an ocean away in the United States. 28 In the early
nineteenth century, both U.S. slave owners and Quaker abolitionists
were of the mind that free blacks (both those who had been born free
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Liberia, supra note 7, at 958-63.
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and former slaves) should be repatriated to Africa. 29 Unsurprisingly, the
groups' motivations were diverse: Quakers believed that free blacks
would have a better chance for freedom and opportunity in Africa than
the antebellum United States, 30 while slaveholders more pragmatically
saw that repatriating free blacks would minimize the danger of slave
rebellions like those that had taken place in the Caribbean.31 Despite
initial and vocal opposition by many white abolitionists and free blacks
themselves, in 1816 a group of mostly Quakers and like-minded
slaveholders formed the American Colonization Society (ACS), with the
aim of founding a home in West Africa for the colonization of free black
Americans. In 1822, eighty-six black emigrants, sponsored by the ACS,
landed on Cape Montserrado in modern-day Liberia and succeeded in
establishing the first settlement on the West African coast. 32 In 1824,
the settlement was named Monrovia after President (and ACS member)
James Monroe and the colony was first named the Republic of Liberia.33
Over the next forty years, 19,000 African-American expatriates settled
in Liberia, along with 5,000 Africans recaptured from slave ships bound
for the Americas and a number of West Indian immigrants.34 Though
financially first driven by the support of whites, over the next several
decades the success and growth of the colony was driven by the desire of
free blacks to create and run their own society.35 Still, the foundation of
Liberia presents a unique example of an intentional community
movement as it included diverse cohorts (white slaveholders, white
abolitionists, and black prospective expatriate colonists) all working to
the same goal: resettlement in a new community of and for African
Americans.
Liberia's early challenges are instructive for other would-be
intentional community movements. Settlers faced obstacles common to
many pioneers, including disease (malaria and yellow fever were
rampant among early settlements) and resistance from the native
29. Anjali Mitter Duva, The Lone Star: The Story of Liberia, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/
wgbhlglobalconnections/liberia/essays/history/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2016).
30. It should be noted that the Quakers were also motivated by a desire to evangelize
throughout Africa and saw in the colonization project an opportunity not only to provide a
better livelihood for free blacks otherwise limited in the United States but also an
opportunity to spread Christianity. See Liberia, supra note 7, at 959.
31. See Duva, supra note 29.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. The antebellum U.S. Congress passed several statutes restricting the slave
trade, and when would-be slave trading vessels were captured, questions were initially
raised as to the proper fate of the would-be slaves on board. Liberia, supra note 7, at 960.
The Liberian colony offered an easy outlet for resettlement. See id.
35. Id.
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population (native communities resisted both the expansion of the
burgeoning settlements and the attempts of some settlers to evangelize
Christianity and Christian ideals in the greater region).36 As a self-
determining intentional community, however, one that had separated
from its prior society (the United States) to form its own, Liberia faced
additional challenges. In its infancy, the Republic of Liberia had no
defined status in the international community. The United States did
not consider Liberia to be a U.S. colony and did not claim responsibility
for any acts by the colonists. 37 Because the Liberian governor was
appointed by the ACS, an organization of private citizens, and because
the settlements simply occupied territory purchased or expropriated
from native owners, the community had no sovereign government.
38
This lack of sovereign government presented significant challenges: as
the community grew, the need for regulations and rules within the
Liberian settlements became increasingly important. When the Liberian
leaders attempted to develop new regulations to govern foreign trade
within the territory and to collect customs revenues, however, the
heretofore "untrammelled [sic]" businessmen objected to and largely
ignored Liberian regulations. 39 When Liberia attempted to enforce its
regulations through the use of force, the home governments of these
businessmen supported their nationals, arguing that Liberia did not
have the right to exercise such use of force, as it was not a sovereign
government. 40
The intention of the Liberian colony was to provide a permanent
home for black expatriates to survive, build, and flourish; the inability
to institute and enforce regulations and rules threatened that goal. To
overcome this challenge to its core ideological driver, then, Liberia
needed to assert its own sovereignty and assume a definite
international status. 41 On the advice of the ACS, in July 1847, the
settlers declared themselves an independent nation and adopted a
constitution modeled on that of the United States.42 Formal recognition
of Liberian sovereignty progressed incrementally over the next several
decades (European nations recognized Liberia early, but the United
States did not formally recognize it until 1862), but the assertion of
36. See Duva, supra note 29.
37. Liberia, supra note 7, at 960.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 961.
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sovereignty allowed the intentional community to continue its attempts
to work toward and achieve its idealized goals. 43
Despite these early successes, the epilogue to the pioneering efforts
of the Liberian intentional community movement is instructive,
particularly for any modern movement that seeks to avoid the dangers
that arise in building any new society. In the early twentieth century,
financial difficulties and the withdrawal of the ACS from the colony
began to severely strain Liberia. 44 By the latter part of the century,
authoritarian rulers and civil war had taken the lives of hundreds of
thousands of Liberians.45 Though Liberia has an unwavering identity
recognized by the international community, internally the nation still
faces significant challenges.
b. Israel
The modern Israeli state is arguably the most enduring and
successful of all intentional communities. By any measure, Israel has
become a significant member of the international order. The country is
one of the planet's few nuclear powers46 and ranks among the top
twenty-five nations in GDP per capita.47 Yet the modern Jewish state of
Israel finds its roots in the proto-Zionist movements of the mid-to-late
nineteenth century, and like many other intentional communities
throughout human history, Israel remains bound to its highly specific
ideology and its members' deeply-held belief that their lives and their
home must be inextricably linked.
The return to the Jewish homeland was a dream before it was
reality. Sachar writes of two early Eastern European rabbis, Judah
Alkalai and Zvi Hirsch Kalischer, who began proselytizing among their
flocks a vision of a new Zion, first in vague terms of messianic mission
(Alkalai wrote that in order to fulfill the prophecy of a coming savior, it
was necessary for Jews to establish colonies in the Holy Land), and later
in terms Sachar describes as "practical messianism" (Kalischer called
for the collaboration of rich Jews first to undertake first steps to
colonize the Holy Land, followed by immigration of believers of all
43. See Duva, supra note 29.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See generally Julian Borger, The Truth About Israel's Secret Nuclear Arsenal,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2014, 1:18 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/15/truth-
israels-secret-nuclear-arsenal (describing the growth of Israel's nuclear power since the
1950s).
47. GDP Per Capita Ranking 2015 Data and Charts, KNOEMA, http://knoema.com
sijweyg/gdp-per-capita-ranking-2015-data-and-charts (last updated Mar. 11, 2016).
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backgrounds, development of a program of self-defense for the new
immigrants, and even plans for an agricultural school in the Holy
Land).48 By the late 1800s, as Eastern European governments began
changing their policies and relationships with their native Jewish
populations, the desire for the Holy Land and a home for the Jews
became more urgent.49 Jewish Enlightment writers wrote of an idyllic
Zion "where each flower is a Psalm, each cedar a song divine, each stone
a book and each rock a tablet."50
Though they were preceded by some measure of village-building
throughout Palestine in the late 1800s and early 1900s, the earliest
prominent, permanent manifestations of the Jewish intentional
communities in modern-day Israel were the kibbutzim. 51 The classical
kibbutz exemplified the intentional community: a group of people moved
to the kibbutz community, which occupied "nationalized" land (land
purchased and owned by the Jewish National Fund, which held the land
in trust for the Jewish people), was culturally homogenous, and was
governed by a democratic process of "weekly meeting."52 The framework
of the Jewish calendar structured kibbutz life, although Levinson
argues that the religious significance of events such as ancient
agricultural holidays were downplayed and the cultural elements of
such events was emphasized. 53
The kibbutzim endured in the midst of the greater, growing Jewish
society that developed outside of these specific communities throughout
Israel. Both within and without the kibbutzim, however, the unique
Jewish identity of immigrants to the Holy Land was near-universal. The
Zionist movement to establish a Jewish state in Israel centered on
Jewish identity, and the persecution that Jews faced throughout much
of Eastern Europe and swaths of the West solidified an identifiable
"other" that the immigrant Jews were pushing against in their exodus.
Yet despite their strength of identity, these intentional communities,
which planted themselves in the midst of an existing society with a
markedly different religious identity, were at substantial risk,
particularly during their earliest years. By the turn of the twentieth
century, Palestinian Arabs appealed to the ruling Ottoman Empire to
48. HOWARD M. SACHAR, A HISTORY OF ISRAEL: FROM THE RISE OF ZIONISM TO OUR
TIME 6-7 (3d ed. 2007).
49. See id. at 13-14.
50. Id. at 9.
51. See 2 KAREN CHRISTENSEN & DAVID LEVINSON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMMUNITY:
FROM THE VILLAGE TO THE VIRTUAL WORLD 731 (2003).
52. Id.
53. Id.
775
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pay greater attention to the growing population of Jewish immigrants
and Zionist colonists5 4
It was the Ottoman Empire's defeat in World War I and the cession
of the Palestinian territory to the British Empire that secured a long-
term future of a Jewish community.5 5 The international-law heir to the
old colonial system, the victors developed the post-WWI mandate
system to combat the problem of how to manage the territorial holdings
of the defeated Central Powers. 56 Underlying the mandate system was a
fundamental shift in international norms concerning such territories,
regarding them as quasisovereign entities with an eye toward eventual
self-government.57 Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations
formed the basis of the idea that the best way to help less-developed
nations make their way to sovereign status was by entrusting the
"tutelage" of those nations to "advanced nations who, by reason of their
resources, their experience or their geographical position" would be good
mandates that would serve as trustees for the benefit of the territory.5 8
Under this "system of international tutelage," there was an implicit
understanding that, in the future, once these territories "civilized"
themselves enough to rule themselves, the mandate system would end
and the territories could join the greater international community as
full and equal sovereigns.5 9
In the Israeli context, the British Empire, which took control of
Palestine as well as other former Ottoman territories, was bound by
treaty to implement the provisions of the so-called "Balfour Declaration"
of 1917, which called for the establishment of a Jewish national home. 60
This new order did not go unchallenged, but with British patronage and
international recognition by the newly-organized League of Nations that
there existed a right for a Jewish state to exist in Palestine, the once-
fledgling intentional community of Jewish immigrants first secured the
legitimacy it needed.6 1
As in Liberia, this formal international recognition of the
sovereignty of the new Jewish state granted the community legitimacy
and allowed the community to grow and flourish. Modern Israel is now
54. ROGER OWEN, STATE, POWER, AND POLITICS IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN
MIDDLE EAST 6 (3d ed. 2004).
55. See id.
56. See Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions:
Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations, 34 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 513, 514-15 (2002).
57. See id. at 515.
58. Id. at 524-25.
59. Id. at 515.
60. OWEN, supra note 54, at 6.
61. See id. at 6-7.
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the home of more than eight million people, 75 percent of whom identify
as Jewish.62 It is a testament to the power of legal recognition and the
power of identifying as a cogent, ideological community that Israel's
strongest international detractors have long refused to use the phrase
"Jewish state" in referring to Israel.63 Maintaining Israel's original
cultural and ideological identity is integral to the very soul of the state,
and the international recognition of the Israeli territory would be
meaningless without an adherence to that tradition.
2. Nonindependent Intentional Subcommunities Within a Majority
Society
Still, despite these two widely known examples of communities that
achieved full sovereignty, the vast majority of intentional communities
exist or have existed as subparts within a larger society. In her classic
Cities on a Hill, Frances FitzGerald details several such intentional
communities that arose in the post-WWII United States. For their
diversity in ideology and composition, yet commonality in challenges
and devotion to the ideals of the community, FitzGerald's ethnographic
research into two of these communities is worth recounting: first, the
Castro, the vibrant gay quarter of San Francisco, which rose to
prominence in the 1960s and 1970s; second, Liberty Baptist, the
conservative Protestant church founded by preacher Jerry Falwell in
Lynchburg, Virginia. 64
a. The Castro
By the early 1970s in San Francisco, waves of gay migration had
made the Castro neighborhood an overwhelming community of choice
for "outed" homosexuals in the country.65 The community was unique
62. Middle East: Israel, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WORLD FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbooklgeos/is.html (last updated
Mar. 7, 2016).
63. See Arab League Refuses Recognizing Israel as "Jewish State' RT (Mar. 10, 2014,
10:14 AM), https://www.rt.com/news/arab-league-israel-state-834/.
64. See FITZGERALD, supra note 4, at 25-202. The title of FitzGerald's work-Cities on
a Hill-derives from words attributed to John Winthrop, the leader of the Puritan group
that would come to found the Massachusetts Bay Colony. See id. at 24. In a sermon to his
Puritan company (the Puritans themselves one of the earliest intentional community
builders in the Americas, who sought to establish a home where they were free to
establish and practice their particular brand of religious community), Winthrop is credited
with saying, "We must consider that we shall be a City Upon a Hill, the eyes of all people
are upon us." Id.
65. Id. at 29.
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 23:2
not because it had a high proportion of homosexual residents-
demographic studies tend to show that the percentage of male
homosexuals in particular has remained a fairly stable percentage of the
population since James Kinsey's first studies on the subject in 194866-
but rather because the Castro had a high proportion of gays and
lesbians who made the decision to live openly in a highly tolerant
community dominated by similar individuals. 67 Virtually all immigrants
to the Castro throughout the 1960s and 1970s came for one reason: to be
a part of a community that accepted and even glorified homosexuals. 68
To that end, though the Castro existed as a community within greater
San Francisco, it became in many ways a distinct society within the
greater whole. FitzGerald write that gay men (and to a certain extent
lesbians, although the Castro was dominated demographically and
culturally by men)69 could spend days "going to their offices, to the
cleaner, the bank, and the health club, dining in restaurants, attending
political meetings, and going to church without coming into contact with
anyone who was not gay."70 The community developed its own political
leaders and even celebrated its own holidays: Gay Freedom Day (dated
from the Stonewall Riots in 1969), a particularized celebration of
Halloween, and the popular Castro Street Fair.7 1 The population of this
community was substantial: in 1977, Harvey Milk, a prominent activist
who was the first openly gay man elected to the San Francisco Board of
Supervisors, 72 estimated that between 25,000 and 30,000 gay people had
moved into the Castro. 73
The biggest challenge the Castro gay community faced was an
external threat that infiltrated the community: the AIDS epidemic. The
public health crisis, whose early epicenter was gay communities like the
Castro, prompted serious debate in the community.7 4 Divisions among
leaders and members of the Castro on how and what type of information
should be distributed on this new threat, and the priorities and
responsibilities for individuals, began to slowly erode the previously
homogenous community. 75 Some were concerned with the impact the
AIDS crisis and emerging research that the virus was passed during
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 33.
69. Id. at 34.
70. Id. at 54.
71. Id.
72. RANDY SHILTs, THE MAYOR OF CASTRO STREET: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF HARVEY
MILK 70 (2008).
73. See FITZGERALD, supra note 4, at 46.
74. Id. at 85, 90
75. See id. at 90-92.
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sexual contact would have on the image of the gay community, while
others were keen on preventing its spread through publicized
warnings.76 Though the community remained a haven for gays and
lesbians, the AIDS crisis and the divisions of ideology within it
facilitated the "opening up" of the Castro to others. In the years
following the initial outbreak in the early 1980s, the Castro's formerly
insular community began to diversify. FitzGerald observed that in April
1985, the Castro's main street now played host to older people and
women with children. 77 Though the gay bars remained, in many ways
the neighborhood became much like the other white, middle-class
neighborhoods in downtown San Francisco.
78
b. Liberty Baptist Church
At the opposite end of the country and opposite end of the liberal-
conservative social spectrum from the Castro-but existing nearly
contemporaneously-was another vibrant example of an intentional
community: the Liberty Baptist Church headed by evangelical preacher
Jerry Falwell in Lynchburg, Virginia. Of course, religion has long
provided a sense of community in disparate forms. 79 But as FitzGerald
notes, unlike most traditional institutionalized religions, Liberty
Baptist represented a "separatist church," with members intentionally
separating themselves from the greater society in pursuit of an ideal:
[Liberty Baptist] provided its members with a way of
living in American society (or, what its pastors called
"the world") without being a part of it: it educated their
children, gave them an entire social life, and occupied
most of their nonworking hours. Its pastors taught
people how to conduct their family lives and instructed
them not just in theology but in a comprehensive
worldview. They involved them in an entire culture
quite different from the one just outside.8 0
76. Id.
77. Id. at 116.
78. Id.
79. See generally PHILIP A. MELLOR & CHRIS SHILLING, RE-FORMING THE BODY:
RELIGION, COMMUNITY AND MODERNITY (1997) (detailing the role of religion in society-
building and critiquing interpretations of religion's role in developing the relation between
an individual's sense of self and community).
80. FITZGERALD, supra note 4, at 14.
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Like the gay community in the Castro, the Liberty Baptist
community existed within a larger society, the city of Lynchburg. In the
midst of the rise of the Moral Majority (when evangelical preachers took
to televisions and political soapboxes to preach the literal word of the
Bible and advocate for political causes in line with biblical ideology),s1
Jerry Falwell's Liberty Baptist church was notable for its identifiable
community. A significant number of the church's members lived in
newly built developer communities on the edge of town; the
congregation was highly homogenous, comprised of almost entirely
white, nuclear families who dressed carefully and associated mostly
with each other.8 2
Beyond their demographic homogeneity, the Liberty Baptist
community was united by ideology, both in terms of religion and values.
In addition to evangelical Christian beliefs, the Liberty Baptist
community espoused and practiced what Falwell preached: traditional
gender roles in marriage, for example, and absolute authority of parents
over their children.83 The community was incredibly insular, believing
that the "worldly" values and diversions (running the gamut from
"Hollywood movies" to drugs)8 4 distracted from their idealized devotion
to their religious values. Outsiders, particularly when they criticized the
church or the community writ large, were quickly dismissed. 85
FitzGerald notes that Lynchburg natives who questioned church policies
were threatened with "God's vengeance."8 6
Yet despite these deeply held, publically espoused beliefs of the
community, what allowed the Liberty Baptist community to survive and
thrive in the greater Lynchburg community was a direct, apparently
conscious effort on the part of the community's leaders not to attack the
status quo of the majority society too aggressively. FitzGerald notes
that, though Falwell would attack broadly the "liberal churches" in the
area, he never called out any local church or minister by name.8 7
Despite the sermons warning against worldly pleasures, Falwell never
campaigned against area dance clubs, the sale of wine or beer in
supermarkets, nor even the Lynchburg-based company that printed
Penthouse magazine.8 8 By carefully keeping the insular community
insular without directly threatening the majority society's own culture
81. See id. at 124-25, 130.
82. Id. at 135-36.
83. See id. at 140.
84. See id. at 138.
85. See id. at 167.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 175.
88. Id. at 176.
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and values, the Liberty Baptist community avoided its own demise from
external threats.
II. THE SEASTEADING MOVEMENT
Against this backdrop of other intentional communities and the
commonalities and challenges for these groups, this Note now turns to
the seasteading movement itself. First, Section A notes that, while
humans have attempted to live at sea at various points in history, the
modern seasteading movement may be distinguished as it has a
specified, identifiable ideology. Section B then examines that ideology
and looks to what, precisely, would drive mankind to the sea.
A. Early Attempts at Living on the High Seas
Despite its futuristic-seeming aims of self-sufficient, manmade
islands in the sea, the seasteading movement is not the first
documented attempt of humans to tame the open ocean and establish
new civilizations on the seas. Indeed, there have been previous, albeit
scattered attempts at creating independent or semi-independent
seagoing civilizations; technological limitations of the past mean that
these attempts have rarely come in the form of attempting life on a
wholly manmade platform (although that is not without precedent),8 9
but in attempts at ocean-based "micronations" on largely underutilized
islands.90
These historical attempts have never proved successful. Arguably
the most famous case of an attempt at a permanent human civilization
at sea involves the case of the so-called "Duchy of Sealand," which
suffered significant legal challenges. The former British antiaircraft
platform eight nautical miles off the eastern coast of Great Britain
declared itself a sovereign state in 1975. 91 Despite the Duchy's
arguments that its permanent residents, grants of citizenship, and
"territory" of the 1,300 square meter platform, in the courts of existing
89. See Alexander A. Bolonkin, Floating Cities, in ENGINEERING EARTH 967, 973
(Stanley D. Brunn, ed. 2011).
90. While relevant examples of failed seasteading attempts are discussed in Sections II
and III of this paper, for a more comprehensive review of modem "new country projects"
undertaken in the last half-century by individuals and groups, see ERWIN S. STRAUSS,
How To START YOUR OWN COUNTRY 51-155 (1979). Strauss reviews dozens of what he
calls "new country" movements by groups, many of which were attempted at sea. See id.
91. See Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, 'Republic of the Reefs:" Nation-Building on the
Continental Shelf and in the World's Oceans, 25 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 81, 109 (1994).
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continental powers, those assumed rights were not upheld.92 Since its
founder moved to the mainland in his old age, the principality has not
attempted to reassert its sovereignty. In other cases where people have
attempted to create their own lawless structures on the high seas, legal
structures have come in to fill that vacuum, often resulting in the
complete dissolution of the seastead or attempted micronation (as in the
case of the short-lived Republic of Minerva off the coast of Tonga)93 or a
lack of a coherent legal structure to guide development has exacerbated
already tenuous financial and administrative arrangements. 94
These early attempts were almost universally "lone wolf' pioneers
seeking to remove themselves entirely from existing society. The
modern seasteading movement is distinct from these early attempts in
that there is, indeed, an entire movement: TSI has nearly two dozen
staffers, advisors, and trustees dedicated to the cause. 95 TSI and its
leaders espouse a distinct, comprehensive ideology (explored below) that
aligns the group far more closely with the types of intentional
communities discussed in Part I than any of the loners who have
attempted to build separatist homes for themselves. Yet these lone
wolves' central ideal-that the sea promises the last lawless frontier-is
what calls the broader movement led by TSI out to sea.
B. The Modern Seasteading Movement: Ideology and Aims
As Part I indicated, intentional communities universally have a
singular underlying ideology driving their creation, and often arise in
response to their constituents' perceived inability to live in accordance
with that ideology in the existing majority society. Seasteaders are no
different. In reviewing the writings, speeches, and opinions of both the
most prominent seasteading activists and of the rank and file, a clear
ideological perspective is seen to drive seasteaders to tackle the
enormous financial, technological, and legal challenges to their cause. 96
92. Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG] [Federal Administrative Court] May 3, 1978,
DEUTscHEs VERWALTUNGSBLATT [DVBL] 510 (Ger.). For an English version of In re Duchy
of Sealand, see 80 INT'L L. REP. 683 (1989), available at http://www.uniset.ca/naty/
80ILR683.htm.
93. See Menefee, supra note 91, at 95-97.
94. See STRAUSS, supra note 90, at 68-69.
95. See Staff/Board/Advisors, SEASTEADING INST., http://www.seasteading.org/about/
staff-board-advisors/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2016).
96. Of course, as in any movement, seasteaders are not a singular, uniform populace
with identical aims and dreams. Yet the leaders of the movement offer the most cogent
representation and writings of certain ideals-self-reliance, experimentation, flexibility-
that are borne out even in the discussion threads by users on the Seasteading Institute's
own website. See, i.e., What Form of Society Would You Pioneer Through Seasteading?,
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To seasteaders, building on the high seas is the best (and perhaps
only) way to achieve more perfect civilizations. In general terms, the
most vocal activists often cite beliefs that the creation of permanent,
manmade, floating cities on the ocean would allow greater individual
freedom for its citizens, opportunities to experiment with governments,
and greater economic opportunities for businesses.97 Yet these talking
points-individual, political, and corporate freedoms-are a
simplification of the underlying ideologies that make seasteaders
believe that their goals cannot be achieved on land in existing societies.
Through its own publications, writings, and members, TSI offers the
greatest repository for understanding the overall movement. TSI
explains its raison d'9tre and emphasis on seasteading as its ultimate
goal:
Our goal is to enable experimentation... Since there is no
land unclaimed by existing governments, seasteading is
the only realistic method for creating new nations. Even
unoccupied islands are the territory of various
countries' Exclusive Economic Zones, in which countries
exercise valuable rights over fishing and mineral
resources.
98
The underlying ideology of TSI and its commitment to "startup
governments" is best espoused in the personal essays and writings of its
founders and leaders. TSI cofounder Patri Friedman (ideological heir
and biological grandson of free-market champion Milton Friedman) has
written essays and made public appearances discussing TSI's mission.99
Friedman's essential belief is that the only way to develop a good or
perfect government is through experimentation.100 He describes the
need for a system which allows for the "easy creation, testing, and
comparison" of alternate government structures, which would have
multiple advantages over traditional, wholly theoretical conceptions of
alternate governments. 10 1  Notably, experimentation encourages
societies to change over time; creates real-world data to aid debate on
the merits of various systems; and enables prospective "customers" of
SEASTEADING INST., http://discuss.seasteading.orgttwhat-form-of-society-would-you-pioneer-
through-seasteading/49/29 (last visited Apr. 14, 2016).
97. See SEASTEADING INST., supra note 13, at 8-9.
98. FAQ, SEASTEADING INST., http://www.seasteading.org/faq/ (last visited Apr. 14,
2016).
99. See Harkinson, supra note 11.
100. See Friedman, supra note 15.
101. Id.
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new governments to effectively try before they buy (that is, experience
the experimental government in reality rather than as mere "mental
abstraction").102
Friedman believes that existing governments and societies are
wholly incompatible with this need for experimentation:
When working within existing institutions, structural
change and policy change are the same, because you can
only change structure by implementing a policy. Only by
starting with a blank slate can you make a better
structure without having to overcome entrenched
interests, which tend to resist innovation because it
reduces their power. Historically, the frontier has
functioned as this canvas for experimentation. 103
The "frontier" is the sea. To Friedman, seasteads are the next,
logical step in human evolution and development. At a public
appearance in 2012, Friedman discussed the evolution of human
societies and noted that there is a need for "new places to try new
rules." 104 He suggested that the United States' ability to develop as a
new nation came only after "bloody revolution" and was only successful
because it had a new frontier in which to develop.10 5 In noting that all
land on the globe is now claimed and that revolutions have become
"increasingly superficial" ("We're changing individual leaders; we're no
longer creating new societies"), Friedman argues that, in a world that
has advanced rapidly technologically, the last frontier where a truly
new society can develop is the sea.10 6 For Friedman, the sea represents
the only opportunity to develop modern societies.
These ideas are reflected not just by the founders and leaders of
TSI, but also the average TSI supporter and member. The TSI website
hosts a user forum, where members who have signed up as interested
parties in the seasteading cause can discuss their concerns, excitement,
102. Id.
103. See id. (citing Bryan Caplan, an economist and adjunct scholar at the Cato
Institute, whose book The Myth of the Rational Voter suggests individuals, and
particularly American voters, are irrational-a break from neoclassical economics which
assumes that individuals will act rationally).
104. TEDx Talks, SeaSteading-Building on the Platform of the Oceans: Patri Friedman
at TEDxSF, YoUTUBE (Apr. 26, 2012), httpsJ/www.youtube.com/watchv=maLAMwhTjHk.
105. See id.
106. Id.; see also Chris Baker, Live Free or Drown: Floating Utopias on the Cheap,
WIRED (Jan. 19, 2009, 12:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/2009/O1/mf-seasteading/ (describing
Friedman's attitude towards seasteading as a "Linux approach" to civilization: providing
basic building parts that then can be experimented with by governmental innovators).
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and vision for a floating future. In one thread entitled, "What Form of
Society Would You Pioneer Through Seasteading?" registered users of
the forums discussed for 227 comments the value of experimenting with
societies based on anarchy, liquid democracy, secularism, and
everything in between. 0 7 One user by the name of Jonas Smith echoed
the sentiments expressed by Friedman, writing in his comment, "One of
the reasons it is so important to create new sovereign nations so as to
experiment with new forms of government is that it is incredibly
hard...impossible, really.. .to change existing systems."108In reading
through these forums, it is clear that, in their own way, seasteaders are
attempting to revive a vision of Plato's Atlantis: a community that
expressly tries to avoid the pitfalls of many modern existing
governments and attempts to achieve an ideal community of choice for
its members.
Indeed, Friedman's writings, as well as those of his ideological
colleagues, are not new. In their proposals for how to better develop the
world are clear echoes of decades of libertarian and even anarchist
philosophers and economists. Understanding that penumbra which
informs and guides TSI is worthwhile before attempting to create a
legal framework within that ideology.
In his writings, Friedman references modern libertarian authors
like Bruce Benson and the late Mancur Olson. 10 9 Benson is a self-
described libertarian anarchist. 110 Benson writes critically of traditional
government structures-particularly democracies-and suggests that,
from an economic perspective, private-sector institutions more
efficiently make and enforce law than traditional public-sector
institutions.' Benson argues that public-sector resources are often
inefficiently used because of a "common pool" problem arising because
those resources are not privately owned. 112 Benson does not envision a
new frontier to experiment, but he does speak highly of the trend
towards privatization of institutions and encourages the trend.11 3 Olson,
another economist, is also critical of democracies, noting that, for long-
107. See What Form of Society Would You Pioneer Through Seasteading?, supra note 9G.
108. Jonas Smith, Reply to What Form of Society Would You Pioneer Through
Seasteading?, SEASTEADING INST., http://discuss.seasteading.orgt/what-form-of-society-would-
you-pioneer-through-seasteading/49/29 (last visited Apr. 14, 2016).
109. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 15.
110. Bruce L. Benson, Some Stuff About Me, http://myweb.fsu.edu/bbenson/ (last
updated Aug. 2008).
111. BRUCE L. BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW: JUSTICE WITHOUT THE STATE 2 (1990).
112. Id. at 131.
113. Id. at 371-73.
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established governments, special interest groups may have a crippling
effect on economic innovation. 114
TSI's ideals have even older roots. Another (perhaps obvious)
inspiration for these ideals is Patri Friedman's own grandfather, the
Nobel-Prize-winning economist Milton Friedman. Milton Friedman,
well-known for his criticism of central banking and call for the abolition
of the Federal Reserve of the United States, was a laissez-faire
economist who advocated for the abolition of most regulations;
privatization of schools, highways, and federal parks; and the complete
dissolution of social welfare programs. 115
Tempering these big ideas and ideological commitments, however, is
a relatively recent appreciation for pragmatism by the movement. In
spring of 2013, TSI announced it was considering an early-stage
seastead termed the "Floating City Project." The Floating City Project
departs from the idea of the complete "clean slate" in a notable way: TSI
aims for the Project to float in the territorial waters of an amenable host
nation, which would give the seastead substantial political autonomy
but also "provide a place for a floating city within the existing
international legal framework, with associated protections and
responsibilities."'1 6 TSI is clear that the Floating City Project is not
their end game or their idea; rather, it is the first stage in their strategy
of "incrementalism."1" 7 TSI notes that it considers the Floating City
Project to be a "proof-of-concept . . . [that] will hopefully spawn many
more experiments with floating cities around the world, including those
further offshore .. .. "118
Thus, in reviewing the writings of the movements' founders and flag
bearers, as well as tracing their ideological ancestors, it appears that
the core values that seasteaders wish to see realized in their floating
communities are flexibility, experimentation, and nonrigidity, as well as
substantial protections for individuals and minimal governmental
oversight.119 Similarly important are free-market principles and
sovereign autonomy, beyond the reach of existing societal interests and
international norms or law that infringe on the other core values of
seasteaders.
114. MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH,
STAGFLATION, AND SOcIAL RIGIDITIES 86-87 (1982).
115. BRIAN DOHERTY, RADICALS FOR CAPITALISM: A FREEWHEELING HISTORY OF THE
MODERN AMERICAN LIBERTARIAN MOVEMENT 455-56 (2007).
116. Floating City Project, SEASTEADING INST., http://www.seasteading.org/floating-city-
project/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2016).
117. Vision/Strategy, SEASTEADING INST., http:I/www.seasteading.org/about/vision-strategy/
(last visited Apr. 14, 2016).
118. Id.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102.
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III. UNDERSTANDING THE DRAW OF THE SEA: WHY BUILDING ON THE
HIGH SEAS PROMISES SEASTEADERS THE REALIZATION OF THEIR IDEALS
Given these core values (flexibility in political systems, minimal
government oversight, freedoms for individuals), it might seem that the
average seasteader would be ripe for revolution. It is a time-honored
human tradition to overthrow our governments and remake them in our
own image, and even the most intractable authoritarian ruler in many
ways is an easier match than the Earth's oceans. Yet, as I explore here,
for seasteaders, the appeal in eschewing all terrestrial governments and
instead seeking to make their permanent residence at points on the
high seas, is that there is little established law that would regulate
their existence or modulate their responsibilities. As Section A
demonstrates, the law of the sea presents unique opportunities for these
seasteaders. However, as Section B emphasizes, it is not anarchy that
seasteaders seek; other international norms would be well in line with
seasteaders' ideals and needs.
A. The Law of the Sea and Legal Realities of Building on the High Seas
The legal realities and challenges of attempting a self-sufficient
community on the high seas are many, but it is precisely in this grey
area of the law of the sea that seasteaders may be able to realize their
marketplace of ideas and governments. Second only to the remaining
substantial technical challenges, 120 seasteading must also seriously
consider how to confront its many potential legal challenges. Though the
Floating City Project espoused by TSI suggests that seasteaders are
willing to compromise in the short term, the overarching ideology
120. Technological strides are making the dream of a life on the sea increasingly
practical (or, at the least, less impractical). See John Vidal, Artificial Island Could be
Solution for Rising Pacific Sea Levels, GUARDIAN (Sept. 8, 2011, 11:47 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/201 1/sep/08/artificial-island-pacific-sea-
levels. The most obvious concern in creating a floating city is the sea itself; high seas,
waves, and extreme events like hurricanes could threaten to destroy a city in moments.
However, potential seasteaders can use lessons from cruise ships and oil rig platforms
(indeed, in their own right, both are large maritime structures similar to the idealized
seastead). See Cities on the Ocean, supra note 14 (modeling a floating city off of the
increasingly popular free-floating platforms used by some oil companies with their
offshore oil drilling platforms). Seastead projects even increasingly have the potential to
provide the comforts of mainland life: satellite or fiber communications options would
allow the seastead to stay in contact with other global partners, and advances in
renewable energy capabilities make the potential wind and wave energy (both plentiful at
sea) a viable reality for powering a relatively modern floating city. See How Do Offshore
Communications Work?, RIGZONE, http://www.rigzone.com/training/insight.asp?iid=337
(last visited Apr. 14, 2016).
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emphasizing total geographic and ideological separation for its
communities-and allowing these seasteads to experiment substantially
with governments and political structures-would require full
realization of the dream of a self-sufficient community that exists in the
region of the earth known legally as "the high seas."
The law of the sea is one of the oldest, most storied branches of
international law. 121 The most clear-cut issue regarding seasteading
movements applies to any protoseastead that would attempt to operate
and exist within the territorial sea (as would the Floating City Project),
contiguous zone, or Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of a continental
state. 22 Under the 1958 United Nations (U.N.) Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS), each coastal state has the right to establish "the
breadth of its territorial sea" up to twelve nautical miles from the
nation's coast. 123
Beyond this territorial sea, a coastal state may also extend its
control over the "contiguous zone": the area twenty-four nautical miles
from the coastal baseline (i.e., an additional twelve nautical miles
"contiguous" to the territorial sea).124 Within this twenty-four nautical
miles of territorial sea and the contiguous zone, independent seasteads
that do not fly the flag of any host nation are virtually impossible. The
1958 UNCLOS authorizes each coastal state to "prevent infringement of
its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations .. .
[and] punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed
within its territory or territorial sea."' 25 The third and widest coastal
latitude a nation may assert jurisdictional control over is its EEZ. 126 The
EEZ, which may extend two hundred nautical miles from the coastal
baselines, delineates an additional area in which the coastal state has
certain exclusive rights, primarily for purposes of natural resource
exploitation and management, the establishment and use of manmade
121. MAZEN ADI, U.N. OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF THE
SEA AND THE CONVENTION ON THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA (2009), http://www.un.org/depts/
los/nipponlunnff.programmejhome/feows-pages/fellows-papers/adi 0809_syria.pdf.
122. See, e.g., Ryan H. Fateh, Note, Is Seasteading the High Seas a Legal Possibility?
Filling the Gaps in International Sovereignty Law and the Law of the Seas, 46 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 899, 913-14 (2013).
123. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 3, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. It is worthwhile to note that the seemingly simplistic
measure from a coastal nation's "baselines" is actually very controversial. See, e.g., Julia
Lisztwan, Note, Stability of Maritime Boundary Agreements, 37 YALE J. INT'L L. 153, 155
(2012). Thus, prospective seasteads or other seagoing vessels attempting to exist primarily
outside of territorial coastal waters must thus be careful in measuring its distance from
shore.
124. UNCLOS, supra note 123, art. 33.
125. Id.
126. Id. art. 55.
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islands and structures, and the pursuit of marine scientific research. 127
Fateh suggests that, given these rules, seasteads attempting to operate
in a coastal nation's asserted EEZ would face serious issues:
[EEZ-based] seasteads would be successful only under
the following criteria: (1) if they are ships or freely
floating platforms; (2) if they are not engaged in any
type of resource extraction; and (3) if they are not
harnessing energy from water, wind, or solar sources.
Only if TSI satisfied these three qualifications would the
United States be unable to interfere in its operations.
However, to be self-sufficient, TSI seasteads envision
precisely these uses of natural resources. Also, the
seasteads would never be built or used in such a way
that they will be considered ship-faring vessels. As such,
although the communities could exist in this limited
capacity, for practical purposes, they would not.128
Thus, within these defined territorial waters, the legal status of an
attempted independent seastead is likely already defined. It would fall
under the jurisdiction of an existing coastal continental state. 129 Yet the
legal status of a seastead that operates on the high seas-the majority
of the globe's oceanic resources, and the ultimate goal of many
prospective seasteaders-is more difficult and potentially offers greater
possibilities that would allow the development of the type of idealized
Atlantis of which seasteaders dream.
For seasteads that could overcome the technological challenges of
such an operation and settle beyond the territorial waters or EEZ of any
terrestrial state, there are less clearly defined legal issues that may
come into play. Fateh neatly sums the most important current relevant
international law that may apply to prospective seasteads operating
beyond territorial waters or the EEZ: the 1958 UNCLOS and the
successor 1982 UNCLOS. 130 Fateh focuses his analysis by considering
TSI a nonstate actor and determines that, as the applicable U.N.
treaties apply only to Member States of the United Nations, generally
speaking they will not apply to TSI (nor, presumably, to other nonstate
127. Id. art. 56.
128. See Fateh, supra note 122, at 914.
129. However, it is useful to note that some states that do not enforce the EEZ might
serve as de facto safe harbors for seasteads, at least until such time as the coastal nation
might choose to exert its authority.
130. See Fateh, supra note 122, at 910-11.
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seasteading groups that may arise in the future).' 3 ' At the least it is
true that none of these bodies of existing law relate directly to
seasteading.132 Fateh notes that the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea, a judiciary body with the power to hear any dispute arising
under the UNCLOS, has never taken a case regarding seasteading
concerns. 133
Since the law regarding seasteads is not well defined at present, a
reliance on traditional interpretations of sovereignty and statehood
might suggest that floating cities on the high seas might well claim
sovereignty and statehood. Keith writes that, particularly for seasteads
that operate not as ships or vessels but as structures (which, given the
oil-rig platform model that more likely satisfies the needs and desires of
floating city residents, is a proper appellation for most seasteads as
conceived of for the purposes of this Note), the only problems that may
block a floating city on the high seas from properly claiming sovereign
status are the two questions of fixed territory and recognition by other
sovereigns. 3 4 Keith answers his own first question, 135 but the concern
for recognition by other sovereigns is more pressing. Indeed, without a
formal legal structure there may be potential, practical threats to free-
floating seasteads by continental sovereigns that attempt to exert their
influence beyond their established territorial waters.136 Indeed, though
this area is not well trodden by legal academics, when authors do pick
up the topic of seasteading movements, they are -generally dismissed as
being impractical in the face of exercise of jurisdiction by terrestrial
states on the high seas (particularly likely in the absence of express
international law supporting or condemning such exercises of
131. Id. at 912.
132. Id. at 911.
133. Id.
134. See Kent M. Keith, Floating Cities: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 1
MARINE POL'Y 190, 198-99 (1977).
135. See id. at 198. "The ocean floating platform would itself be a physical domain, but it
would rest on another domain-the ocean. Floating cities, which wandered about the
world would be nomadic, and there is some thought to the effect that a band of nomads
does not constitute a state. One difference between a band of nomads and an itinerant
floating city is that a band of nomads may live on lands claimed by others, while a floating
city may live on oceans claimed by no one. The solution to the question of territory may be
to establish a horizontal property regime. The floating city could be granted territorial
rights above the ocean surface, much as today's condominium owners own a piece of 'land'
ten stories above the ground. Floating cities may thus become condominium countries." Id.
136. See Cities on the Ocean, supra note 14 ("Some countries (notably America) assert
the right to extend their jurisdictions, in matters affecting their citizens, across the entire
planet.").
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jurisdiction). 137 Balloun writes, "Given the United States' penchant for
exercising jurisdiction thousands of miles from its coastlines, not even
the territorial seas of other nations may be sufficient to protect a
seastead from American jurisdiction."138  Without any express
international law doctrine supporting the existence or promulgation of
floating cities, the United States or other existing coastal states may
readily "swoop in" to fill the legal vacuum.
B. Other International Considerations
It is important to note that, in seeking to take to the high seas,
seasteaders are not seeking no legal or political system: the dream is not
necessarily an anarchistic floating island free from absolutely any
authority, internal or external. The true aim of seasteaders is better
characterized as desires for freedom for experimentation and a
commitment to individual rights. Neither goal is incompatible with the
establishment of a domestic law structure for seasteads, nor with the
imposition of certain international law tenets. Indeed, to achieve those
aims, pure anarchy-absence of government or law-is impractical. To
ensure long-term respect of individual rights and freedoms, an
underlying framework that guides and roots seasteading development is
absolutely essential, and much of international law aids, not detracts,
from those goals.
Many elements of international law would be welcome by
seasteaders. International law affects daily life for most of the planet in
often unassuming but crucial, fundamental ways. The American Society
of International Law has drafted "International Law: 100 Ways It
Shapes Our Lives," outlining a round number of examples. 139 Among
dozens of other expected aspects of modern life, international law allows
for a human anywhere on the planet to know what date and time it is
(first established by the International Meridian Conference of 1884);
ensures that mail can be reliably sent anywhere in the world
(Constitution of the Universal Postal Union in 1964); facilitates
obtaining up-to-date weather forecasting through compliance with
international standards and rules for weather data (Convention of the
World Meteorological Organization in 1947 and International
137. See generally 0. Shane Balloun, The True Obstacle to the Autonomy of Seasteads:
American Law Enforcement Jurisdiction over Homesteads on the High Seas, 24 U.S.F.
MAR. L.J. 409 (2011) (discussing a multitude of examples of previous jurisdictional issues
on the high sea).
138. Id. at 453.
139. AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L LAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW: 101 WAYS IT SHAPES OUR LivEs
(2011), https://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/100%20Ways%2OBooklet_2011.pdf.
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Telecommunication Convention of 1932); and permits individuals to
travel across almost any border simply through possession of a
standardized passport (International Conference on Passports, Customs
Formalities and Through Tickets of 1920 and the more modern
International Civil Aviation Organization established in 1947). 140
Most of these essential underpinnings are not at odds with the core
seasteader ideals and aims in migrating to the high seas. While
seasteaders may desire to be free from undue government interference,
otherwise isolated citizens will almost assuredly want to take advantage
of opportunities to receive mail from mainlander loved ones and travel
to visit friends and family with ease (not to mention the practical
desires of tapping in to worldwide weather data when one of your
society's biggest threats is a hurricane). Availing itself of much of
international law and agreements does not diminish the goal of the
seastead. Indeed, TSI itself answers the question "Does international
law pose a threat to the creation of permanent, autonomous ocean
communities?" in the negative. 141 TSI answers that it "has not found
any examples or precedent that would lead us to believe that
international law will pose a significant threat to permanent ocean-city
states."142 Thus, it is clear that the main movers and shakers of
seasteaders acknowledge the aforementioned baseline benefits of
international law and membership in the international community. In
identifying the challenges for seasteaders and the ways they may
overcome them, then, it is important to note that acceptance within the
international community and a defined presence within it are key
elements that support-not detract from-the seasteader ideology.
IV. CONFRONTING AND OVERCOMING CHALLENGES COMMON TO
INTENTIONAL COMMUNITIES AND UNIQUE TO THE SEASTEADING
MOVEMENT
In considering the seasteading movement both in light of its
commonalities with other intentional community movements and with
respect to the unique circumstances of the movement's modus operandi,
it is clear that there are numerous considerations and challenges that,
should a seastead ever set sail, its pioneers could expect to have to
overcome. The historical examples discussed in Part I offer some useful
illustrations, and those, coupled with the legal realities of the high seas,
suggest that, in order to succeed long-term, prospective seasteaders
140. Id. at 2-3, 14.
141. See FAQ, supra note 98.
142. Id.
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should aim to pursue eventual sovereign state status, with a general
approval and recognition of the international order.
There are several reasons for this. First, the fact that the legal
question of how to deal with such seasteads remains largely open is a
dangerous prospect for builders of intentional communities. As the
technology for seasteads is still nascent and the oceans have not yet
risen to such a level as to make floating cities a necessity, little legal
analysis has been conducted to consider the implications and potential
framework in which such cities might exist. 143 Where such research has
briefly considered seasteads, it is often dismissive 1 " and a survey of
existing literature indicates that no apparent research has ever
considered a workable framework for a floating city on the high seas. As
Balloun notes, while the high seas are unclaimed by any existing
sovereign, at present there is little affirmative law preventing
sovereigns (particularly, in Balloun's view, the United States) from
pursuing ex-nationals that seek to make a claim for themselves
somewhere on the high seas. In light of this legal uncertainty, it is
integral that a seastead aim to assert itself as an independent
sovereign, with the commonly understood international rights and
obligations of such status.
Historical examples discussed in this paper lend credence to the
idea that assertion of sovereignty would be essential to the success of
the seastead. Though there are numerous examples of successful
nonindependent intentional communities that exist within a majority
society without a defined legal status or protections, those communities
are susceptible to outside influences and corruption. As FitzGerald
noted in her ethnographic research into the Castro, for example, outside
threats-both real (AIDS) and existential (influx of heterosexual
individuals and families)-transformed the once-insular cabal of the
Castro into simply another part of the city within a few decades. This
type of outside influence is antithetical to the seasteader ideal, which is
fiercely ideological. Seasteaders demand that their own community
members have the ability to control all political and economic process in
a way avoids the "increasingly superficial" types of governments of
mainland sovereigns. Here too the examples of communities that did
assert their own sovereignty are illustrative: the Liberian problem-
whereby the community originated without a sovereign government and
thus could not enforce regulations within the Liberian settlements to
govern the activity of foreign traders--demonstrates why an assertion of
143. See, e.g., Michael Gagain, Climate Change, Sea Level Rise, and Artificial Islands:
Saving the Maldives' Statehood and Maritime Claims Through the "Constitution of the
Oceans" 23 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POLY 77, 104 (2012).
144. See Balloun, supra note 137.
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sovereignty (backed by the recognition thereof by strong existing
sovereigns) is integral to the long-term success of the community.
CONCLUSION
If Plato's Atlantis is to rise again, she must sail on the winds of
particularly strong-willed ideologues. The Seasteading Institute and the
members of the seasteading movement confront many challenges, not
only technologically but socially and politically as well. The unique legal
opportunity embodied in taking to the sea promises certain elements of
the freedoms that seasteaders desire, but if they wish to ensure their
own long-term success, seasteaders ought to take valuable lessons from
the intentional communities that have come before them.
